[RFC PATCH v2 2/5] lsm: introduce hooks for kdbus
Paul Moore
pmoore at redhat.com
Mon Oct 5 20:41:19 UTC 2015
Add LSM access control hooks to kdbus; several new hooks are added and
the existing security_file_receive() hook is reused. The new hooks
are listed below:
* security_kdbus_conn_new
Check if the current task is allowed to create a new kdbus
connection.
* security_kdbus_own_name
Check if a connection is allowed to own a kdbus service name.
* security_kdbus_conn_talk
Check if a connection is allowed to talk to a kdbus peer.
* security_kdbus_conn_see
Check if a connection can see a kdbus peer.
* security_kdbus_conn_see_name
Check if a connection can see a kdbus service name.
* security_kdbus_conn_see_notification
Check if a connection can receive notifications.
* security_kdbus_proc_permission
Check if a connection can access another task's pid namespace info.
* security_kdbus_init_inode
Set the security label on a kdbusfs inode
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore at redhat.com>
---
ChangeLog:
- v2
* Implemented suggestions by Stephen Smalley
* call security_kdbus_conn_new() sooner
* reworked hook inside kdbus_conn_policy_own_name()
* fixed if-conditional in kdbus_conn_policy_talk()
* reworked hook inside kdbus_conn_policy_see_name_unlocked()
* reworked hook inside kdbus_conn_policy_see()
* reworked hook inside kdbus_conn_policy_see_notification()
* added the security_kdbus_init_inode() hook
- v1
* Initial draft
---
include/linux/security.h | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
ipc/kdbus/connection.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++----------
ipc/kdbus/fs.c | 6 ++
ipc/kdbus/message.c | 19 +++++--
ipc/kdbus/metadata.c | 6 +-
security/security.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 18264ea..7992663 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ struct msg_queue;
struct xattr;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
struct mm_struct;
+struct kdbus_creds;
+struct kdbus_pids;
+struct pid;
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
@@ -1300,6 +1303,45 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @file contains the struct file being transferred.
* @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
*
+ * @kdbus_conn_new
+ * Check if the current task is allowed to create a new kdbus connection.
+ * @creds credentials for the new connection
+ * @fake_creds kdbus faked credentials
+ * @fake_pids kdbus faked pids
+ * @fake_seclabel kdbus faked security label
+ * @owner kdbus owner
+ * @privileged kdbus privileged
+ * @is_activator kdbus activator boolean
+ * @is_monitor kdbus monitor boolean
+ * @is_policy_holder kdbus policy holder boolean
+ * @kdbus_own_name
+ * Check if a connection is allowed to own a kdbus service name.
+ * @creds requestor's credentials
+ * @name service name
+ * @kdbus_conn_talk
+ * Check if a connection is allowed to talk to a kdbus peer.
+ * @creds requestor's credentials
+ * @creds_peer peer credentials
+ * @kdbus_conn_see
+ * Check if a connection can see a kdbus peer.
+ * @creds requestor's credentials
+ * @creds_peer peer credentials
+ * @kdbus_conn_see_name
+ * Check if a connection can see a kdbus service name.
+ * @creds requestor's credentials
+ * @name service name
+ * @kdbus_conn_see_notification
+ * Check if a connection can receive notifications.
+ * @creds requestor's credentials
+ * @kdbus_proc_permission
+ * Check if a connection can access another task's pid namespace info.
+ * @cred requestor's credentials
+ * @pid target task's pid struct
+ * @kdbus_init_inode
+ * Set the security label on a kdbusfs inode
+ * @inode kdbusfs inode
+ * @creds inode owner credentials
+ *
* @ptrace_access_check:
* Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
* @child process.
@@ -1468,6 +1510,22 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*binder_transfer_file) (struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
+ int (*kdbus_conn_new)(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct kdbus_creds *fake_creds,
+ const struct kdbus_pids *fake_pids,
+ const char *fake_seclabel,
+ bool owner, bool privileged, bool is_activator,
+ bool is_monitor, bool is_policy_holder);
+ int (*kdbus_own_name)(const struct cred *creds, const char *name);
+ int (*kdbus_conn_talk)(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer);
+ int (*kdbus_conn_see)(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer);
+ int (*kdbus_conn_see_name)(const struct cred *creds, const char *name);
+ int (*kdbus_conn_see_notification)(const struct cred *creds);
+ int (*kdbus_proc_permission)(const struct cred *creds, struct pid *pid);
+ int (*kdbus_init_inode)(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *creds);
+
int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
@@ -1772,6 +1830,21 @@ int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to);
int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
+int security_kdbus_conn_new(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct kdbus_creds *fake_creds,
+ const struct kdbus_pids *fake_pids,
+ const char *fake_seclabel,
+ bool owner, bool privileged, bool is_activator,
+ bool is_monitor, bool is_policy_holder);
+int security_kdbus_own_name(const struct cred *creds, const char *name);
+int security_kdbus_conn_talk(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer);
+int security_kdbus_conn_see(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer);
+int security_kdbus_conn_see_name(const struct cred *creds, const char *name);
+int security_kdbus_conn_see_notification(const struct cred *creds);
+int security_kdbus_proc_permission(const struct cred *creds, struct pid *pid);
+int security_kdbus_init_inode(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *creds);
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
@@ -1984,6 +2057,59 @@ static inline int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kdbus_conn_new(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct kdbus_creds *fake_creds,
+ const struct kdbus_pids *fake_pids,
+ const char *fake_seclabel,
+ bool owner, bool privileged,
+ bool is_activator,
+ bool is_monitor,
+ bool is_policy_holder)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_own_name(const struct cred *creds,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_conn_talk(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_conn_see(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_conn_see_name(const struct cred *creds,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_conn_see_notification(const struct cred *creds)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_proc_permission)(const struct cred *creds,
+ struct pid *pid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kdbus_init_inode(struct inode *inode,
+ const struct *creds)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
diff --git a/ipc/kdbus/connection.c b/ipc/kdbus/connection.c
index ef63d65..1cb87b3 100644
--- a/ipc/kdbus/connection.c
+++ b/ipc/kdbus/connection.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -108,6 +109,14 @@ static struct kdbus_conn *kdbus_conn_new(struct kdbus_ep *ep,
if (!owner && (creds || pids || seclabel))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ ret = security_kdbus_conn_new(get_cred(file->f_cred),
+ creds, pids, seclabel,
+ owner, privileged,
+ is_activator, is_monitor,
+ is_policy_holder);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
ret = kdbus_sanitize_attach_flags(hello->attach_flags_send,
&attach_flags_send);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1435,12 +1444,12 @@ bool kdbus_conn_policy_own_name(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
return false;
}
- if (conn->owner)
- return true;
+ if (!conn->owner &&
+ kdbus_policy_query(&conn->ep->bus->policy_db, conn_creds, name,
+ hash) < KDBUS_POLICY_OWN)
+ return false;
- res = kdbus_policy_query(&conn->ep->bus->policy_db, conn_creds,
- name, hash);
- return res >= KDBUS_POLICY_OWN;
+ return (security_kdbus_own_name(conn_creds, name) == 0);
}
/**
@@ -1465,14 +1474,13 @@ bool kdbus_conn_policy_talk(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
to, KDBUS_POLICY_TALK))
return false;
- if (conn->owner)
- return true;
- if (uid_eq(conn_creds->euid, to->cred->uid))
- return true;
+ if (!conn->owner && !uid_eq(conn_creds->euid, to->cred->uid) &&
+ !kdbus_conn_policy_query_all(conn, conn_creds,
+ &conn->ep->bus->policy_db, to,
+ KDBUS_POLICY_TALK))
+ return false;
- return kdbus_conn_policy_query_all(conn, conn_creds,
- &conn->ep->bus->policy_db, to,
- KDBUS_POLICY_TALK);
+ return (security_kdbus_conn_talk(conn_creds, to->cred) == 0);
}
/**
@@ -1491,19 +1499,19 @@ bool kdbus_conn_policy_see_name_unlocked(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
const struct cred *conn_creds,
const char *name)
{
- int res;
+ if (!conn_creds)
+ conn_creds = conn->cred;
/*
* By default, all names are visible on a bus. SEE policies can only be
* installed on custom endpoints, where by default no name is visible.
*/
- if (!conn->ep->user)
- return true;
+ if (conn->ep->user &&
+ kdbus_policy_query_unlocked(&conn->ep->policy_db, conn_creds, name,
+ kdbus_strhash(name)) < KDBUS_POLICY_SEE)
+ return false;
- res = kdbus_policy_query_unlocked(&conn->ep->policy_db,
- conn_creds ? : conn->cred,
- name, kdbus_strhash(name));
- return res >= KDBUS_POLICY_SEE;
+ return (security_kdbus_conn_see_name(conn_creds, name) == 0);
}
static bool kdbus_conn_policy_see_name(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
@@ -1523,6 +1531,9 @@ static bool kdbus_conn_policy_see(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
const struct cred *conn_creds,
struct kdbus_conn *whom)
{
+ if (!conn_creds)
+ conn_creds = conn->cred;
+
/*
* By default, all names are visible on a bus, so a connection can
* always see other connections. SEE policies can only be installed on
@@ -1530,10 +1541,13 @@ static bool kdbus_conn_policy_see(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
* peers from each other, unless you see at least _one_ name of the
* peer.
*/
- return !conn->ep->user ||
- kdbus_conn_policy_query_all(conn, conn_creds,
- &conn->ep->policy_db, whom,
- KDBUS_POLICY_SEE);
+ if (conn->ep->user &&
+ !kdbus_conn_policy_query_all(conn, conn_creds,
+ &conn->ep->policy_db, whom,
+ KDBUS_POLICY_SEE))
+ return false;
+
+ return (security_kdbus_conn_see(conn_creds, whom->cred) == 0);
}
/**
@@ -1551,6 +1565,9 @@ bool kdbus_conn_policy_see_notification(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
const struct cred *conn_creds,
const struct kdbus_msg *msg)
{
+ if (!conn_creds)
+ conn_creds = conn->cred;
+
/*
* Depending on the notification type, broadcasted kernel notifications
* have to be filtered:
@@ -1567,18 +1584,22 @@ bool kdbus_conn_policy_see_notification(struct kdbus_conn *conn,
case KDBUS_ITEM_NAME_ADD:
case KDBUS_ITEM_NAME_REMOVE:
case KDBUS_ITEM_NAME_CHANGE:
- return kdbus_conn_policy_see_name(conn, conn_creds,
- msg->items[0].name_change.name);
+ if (!kdbus_conn_policy_see_name(conn, conn_creds,
+ msg->items[0].name_change.name))
+ return false;
case KDBUS_ITEM_ID_ADD:
case KDBUS_ITEM_ID_REMOVE:
- return true;
+ /* fall through for the LSM check */
+ break;
default:
WARN(1, "Invalid type for notification broadcast: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)msg->items[0].type);
return false;
}
+
+ return (security_kdbus_conn_see_notification(conn_creds) == 0);
}
/**
diff --git a/ipc/kdbus/fs.c b/ipc/kdbus/fs.c
index 68818a8..4e84e89 100644
--- a/ipc/kdbus/fs.c
+++ b/ipc/kdbus/fs.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "bus.h"
@@ -192,6 +193,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations fs_inode_iops = {
static struct inode *fs_inode_get(struct super_block *sb,
struct kdbus_node *node)
{
+ int ret;
struct inode *inode;
inode = iget_locked(sb, node->id);
@@ -200,6 +202,10 @@ static struct inode *fs_inode_get(struct super_block *sb,
if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW))
return inode;
+ ret = security_kdbus_init_inode(inode, node->creds);
+ if (ret)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
inode->i_private = kdbus_node_ref(node);
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &empty_aops;
inode->i_mode = node->mode & S_IALLUGO;
diff --git a/ipc/kdbus/message.c b/ipc/kdbus/message.c
index ae565cd..acbe981 100644
--- a/ipc/kdbus/message.c
+++ b/ipc/kdbus/message.c
@@ -150,12 +150,17 @@ int kdbus_gaps_install(struct kdbus_gaps *gaps, struct kdbus_pool_slice *slice,
for (i = 0; i < gaps->n_fds; ++i) {
int fd;
+ ret = security_file_receive(gaps->fd_files[i]);
+ if (ret) {
+ incomplete_fds = true;
+ fds[n_fds++] = -1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
incomplete_fds = true;
- WARN_ON(!gaps->fd_files[i]);
-
fds[n_fds++] = fd < 0 ? -1 : fd;
}
@@ -178,6 +183,13 @@ int kdbus_gaps_install(struct kdbus_gaps *gaps, struct kdbus_pool_slice *slice,
for (i = 0; i < gaps->n_memfds; ++i) {
int memfd;
+ ret = security_file_receive(gaps->memfd_files[i]);
+ if (ret) {
+ incomplete_fds = true;
+ fds[n_fds++] = -1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
memfd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
if (memfd < 0) {
incomplete_fds = true;
@@ -194,9 +206,6 @@ int kdbus_gaps_install(struct kdbus_gaps *gaps, struct kdbus_pool_slice *slice,
* message.
*/
- WARN_ON(!gaps->memfd_offsets[i]);
- WARN_ON(!gaps->memfd_files[i]);
-
kvec.iov_base = &memfd;
kvec.iov_len = sizeof(memfd);
ret = kdbus_pool_slice_copy_kvec(slice, gaps->memfd_offsets[i],
diff --git a/ipc/kdbus/metadata.c b/ipc/kdbus/metadata.c
index 71ca475..07c45d7 100644
--- a/ipc/kdbus/metadata.c
+++ b/ipc/kdbus/metadata.c
@@ -1182,11 +1182,9 @@ static unsigned int kdbus_proc_permission(const struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
const struct cred *cred,
struct pid *target)
{
- if (pid_ns->hide_pid < 1)
- return KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL;
-
/* XXX: we need groups_search() exported for aux-groups */
- if (gid_eq(cred->egid, pid_ns->pid_gid))
+ if ((pid_ns->hide_pid < 1 || gid_eq(cred->egid, pid_ns->pid_gid)) &&
+ security_kdbus_proc_permission(cred, target) == 0)
return KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL;
/*
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e9b1f4..2e5ce04 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -158,6 +158,56 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file);
}
+int security_kdbus_conn_new(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct kdbus_creds *fake_creds,
+ const struct kdbus_pids *fake_pids,
+ const char *fake_seclabel,
+ bool owner, bool privileged, bool is_activator,
+ bool is_monitor, bool is_policy_holder)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_conn_new(creds, fake_creds, fake_pids,
+ fake_seclabel, owner, privileged,
+ is_activator, is_monitor,
+ is_policy_holder);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_own_name(const struct cred *creds, const char *name)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_own_name(creds, name);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_conn_talk(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_conn_talk(creds, creds_peer);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_conn_see(const struct cred *creds,
+ const struct cred *creds_peer)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_conn_see(creds, creds_peer);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_conn_see_name(const struct cred *creds, const char *name)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_conn_see_name(creds, name);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_conn_see_notification(const struct cred *creds)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_conn_see_notification(creds);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_proc_permission(const struct cred *creds, struct pid *pid)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_proc_permission(creds, pid);
+}
+
+int security_kdbus_init_inode(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *creds)
+{
+ return security_ops->kdbus_init_inode(inode, creds);
+}
+
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
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