[PATCH] Fix AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD event formatting

[Steve Grubb]

On Tuesday, November 22, 2016 8:56:57 AM EST Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 11/21/2016 04:50 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb at redhat.com> wrote:
> >> The AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD event has dangling text that means the same
> >> thing
> >> as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger
> >> issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch
> >> fixes the noted problems.
> 
> A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic
> meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the
> kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field
> to determine whether it succeeded".  So anything in userspace that used
> the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was
> successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused.

I really can't have implicit success. I need to have a field to point to that 
says yes/no. It can be hard coded to res=1 (success), but it needs to be 
there.


> While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record
> previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy
> would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active
> at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading.

OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a 
requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load. 
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications 
of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes 
such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a 
policy.


> This overlapswith https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1,
> which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where
> policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and
> policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.

I see. That should be an audited event. If you have a datacenter with a 
thousand machines, its best to get this in the audit trail so it can be 
alerted on at a central collector.

So, what should we do about the patch? I'm willing to modify it.

-Steve

> >> Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb at redhat.com>
> > 
> > First off, for patches such as these, I think it is good to CC the
> > affected subsystem, SELinux in this case (fixed).
> > 
> > Beyond that, I'm a little concerned that you adding fields to record
> > in the middle.  In the past you've warned against inserting fields in
> > the middle of the record, or reordering fields in general ("you'll
> > break the world") due to some poor userspace practices, yet you do
> > these exact things when it suits you.
> > 
> > We need a consistent message when it comes to userspace record
> > processing so we know what we can do in the kernel without causing
> > massive failure.
> > 
> >> --- vanilla-4.9-rc5.orig/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c   2016-11-16
> >> 15:16:34.738723900 -0500 +++
> >> linux-4.9.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc24.x86_64/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c  
> >> 2016-11-21 12:16:08.046787604 -0500 @@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t
> >> sel_write_load(struct fil
> >> 
> >>  {
> >>  
> >>         ssize_t length;
> >>         void *data = NULL;
> >> 
> >> +       unsigned int result = 0;
> >> 
> >>         mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
> >> 
> >> @@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil
> >> 
> >>         length = sel_make_bools();
> >>         if (length)
> >> 
> >> -               goto out1;
> >> +               goto out;
> >> 
> >>         length = sel_make_classes();
> >>         if (length)
> >> 
> >> -               goto out1;
> >> +               goto out;
> >> 
> >>         length = sel_make_policycap();
> >>         if (length)
> >> 
> >> -               goto out1;
> >> +               goto out;
> >> 
> >>         length = count;
> >> 
> >> +       result = 1;
> >> 
> >> -out1:
> >> 
> >> +out:
> >>         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
> >>         AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
> >> 
> >> -               "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
> >> +               "uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u",
> >> +               from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)),
> >> 
> >>                 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> >> 
> >> -               audit_get_sessionid(current));
> >> -out:
> >> +               audit_get_sessionid(current), result);
> >> +
> >> 
> >>         mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
> >>         vfree(data);
> >>         return length;
> >> 
> >> --
> >> Linux-audit mailing list
> >> Linux-audit at redhat.com
> >> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit