signed tarballs

[Steve Grubb]

On Thursday, April 13, 2017 5:05:36 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 5:00 PM, William Roberts
> 
> <bill.c.roberts at gmail.com> wrote:
> > Isn't the hash on the https people's page?

No, its on the mail list. The mail list is moderated. Only a handful of people 
could post a spoofed message.

> > Which last time I looked wasnt throwing cert errors in chrome.
> 
> Unless Steve has exclusive administrative access to people.redhat.com
> (I think it is safe to say he does not, but correct me if I'm wrong
> Steve <b>) 

Nope.

> you can't trust an unsigned checksum regardless of how
> strong the https cert/crypto as the web admin could still tamper with
> the data.

They would have to go tamper with the mail list where all the hashes are 
publicly disclosed, too. There are multiple mail list archives. Then they 
would have to post the tampered tarball to the Fedora Build System which also 
publicly discloses hashs. And the Fedora Build System requires several 
identity checks to check it in and it maintains a log.

You might get one, but you can't get them all. I'd say just a simple check of 
the hash would catch most problems. If not, then I'd trust what's in Fedora 
over the people page.

-Steve