Limiting SECCOMP audit events
Steve Grubb
sgrubb at redhat.com
Fri Dec 15 16:02:19 UTC 2017
On Thursday, December 14, 2017 6:06:30 PM EST Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 12/14/2017 09:19 AM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > On Thursday, December 14, 2017 10:04:48 AM EST Tyler Hicks wrote:
> >> On 12/13/2017 05:58 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> >> > Over the last month, the amount of seccomp events in audit logs is
> >> >
> >> > sky-rocketing. I have over a million events in the last 2 days. Most of
> >> >
> >> > this is generated by firefox and qt webkit.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > I am wondering if the audit package should ship a file for
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > /usr/lib/sysctl.d/60-auditd.conf
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > wherein it has
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > kernel.seccomp.actions_logged = kill_process kill_thread errno
> >>
> >> I agree with Kees here. IMO, you only want "kill_process kill_thread"
> >>
> >> which is the default.
> >
> >
> >
> > The default appears to be all of the types of events without setting
> > kernel.seccomp.actions_logged.
>
> Ah, right. I didn't correctly remember the final implementation details.
> The default sysctl setting is to allow all actions except for RET_ALLOW
> to be logged.
>
> I think the easiest description of the logic is in the commit message of
> 59f5cf44a38284eb9e76270c786fb6cc62ef8ac4:
>
> if action == RET_ALLOW:
> do not log
> else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
> log
> else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
> log
> else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
> log
> else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
> log
> else:
> do not log
>
> I think I originally misunderstood your first email in this thread. I
> thought you were saying that you were experiencing more seccomp audit
> events in 4.14 versus 4.13 and that you felt a regression had been
> introduced. After rereading, I think you're asking why you're getting
> seccomp RET_TRAP actions logged even though "trap" isn't in the
> actions_logged sysctl.
Yes, exactly. I have been experiencing large amounts of SECCOMP events
starting with qt webkit in kde and thought 4.14 would finally let me tame
those events. I have opened a couple bz asking developers if they really meant
to go live with a policy that is experiencing so many denials. But the
consensus is this is intended. (But I think they also have not actually tried
to use their audit logs.)
> The reason is because I didn't get clear direction from the audit
> folks about to do when audit is enabled and the process is being audited
> and, therefore, I didn't feel comfortable rocking the boat. In that
> situation, the decision to log is the same as it was in earlier kernels.
> Specifically, you're hitting the last "else if" conditional in the
> pseudocode above.
And here I thought you were also seeing large numbers of seccomp events and
were making a way to control what gets logged. In any event, I think we better
understand each other now. :-)
> If you're happy with having the actions_logged sysctl control whether or
> not to log seccomp actions taken for processes that are being audited,
> then I think the following (untested) patch should do exactly what you
> want.
OK. Great. With developers starting to use the trap return value, audit logs
are getting swamped by benign events. We truly need a knob to eliminate the
noise from the signal.
> I imagine that you'd also want seccomp to emit audit events whenever the
> value of the actions_logged sysctl is changed, which should be pretty easy
> to do.
Sure. If you want to add it, then it should be roughly like this:
struct tty_struct *tty;
const struct cred *cred;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
cred = current_cred();
tty = audit_get_tty(current);
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
task_tgid_nr(current),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
audit_get_loginuid(current)),
tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
audit_get_sessionid(current));
audit_put_tty(tty);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
audit_log_format(ab, "op=seccomp-logging");
<You can log the new value here if you wish - just can't have spaces in the
value. Numbers or mask is fine.>
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%u", res);
where res above is a 1 for success and 0 for failure. Failure is likely to be
due to not having the capability that allows setting the sysctl.
> I hope this helps!
Thanks!
-Steve
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index af410d9..095b5dd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode
> *parent, }
> void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
>
> -static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int
> code) -{
> - if (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> - __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
> -}
> -
> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> {
> if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> @@ -502,8 +496,6 @@ static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
> { }
> static inline void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int
> code) { }
> -static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int
> code) -{ }
> static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 5f0dfb2ab..914a707 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -590,12 +590,6 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall,
> long signr, u32 action, */
> if (log)
> return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
> -
> - /*
> - * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based
> - * on whether the current task itself is being audited.
> - */
> - return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
> }
>
> /*
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