[Pki-devel] availability/behaviour of internal NSS token in FIPS mode

Christina Fu cfu at redhat.com
Fri Apr 28 16:57:25 UTC 2017


Hi Fraser,

Given that today is the code freeze for this round, and I need to wrap 
up a ticket today so it's hard to squeeze it into my time to context 
switch and give your question a proper thinking,  I suggest we handle it 
after this release.

Hope it's okay with you.

thanks,

Christina


On 04/28/2017 03:32 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
> or, "can I pretty please delete all this code?" ^_^
>
> Hi Christina,
>
> Ade has reviewed my PKCS #12 AES patches for CC effort (thanks Ade!)
> We have one main area where we need your feedback.
>
> The KRA PKCS #12 recovery process for encrypted (cf. wrapped) keys
> previously performed the encryption and assembled the
> EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure in a rather "manual" way (~80
> LOC).  In my patch to convert this code path to use AES encrypted, I
> take an alternative (and much fewer LOC) approach: importing the
> private key to the *internal* key storage token, as a *temporary*
> key, and then invoking the same routine as is used for the wrapped
> key case.
>
> Our question: is this fine to do when the system is in FIPS mode?
> The assumption is that the internal crypto token is always available
> and that it can do raw (unencrypted) private key import, and
> wrapping private keys to a symmetric key, while in FIPS mode.  We
> just need to check this assumption.
>
> The gerrit review of the patch involved is here:
> https://review.gerrithub.io/#/c/359027/
>
> Thanks,
> Fraser




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