[redhat-lspp] Re: MLS enforcing PTYs, sshd, and newrole

[Daniel J Walsh]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2006-10-19 at 09:21 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>   
>> So one proposed solution to this is to take away the newrole -l 
>> functionality all together and to add Sensitivity selection to the local 
>> login. 
>>
>> We can implement pam_selinux to ask for the sensitivity level
>>
>>
>> username: dwalsh
>> passwd: ********
>> Sensitivity: SystemLow
>>
>> If we then remove -l from newrole we are done?
>>     
>
> pam_selinux used to have support to let the user pick from the list of
> reachable contexts for the user.  So you could just restore that
> support.
>   
I don't think so.  This allowed you to select your TE role, not your 
Sensitivity.  The problem is selecting your sensivity.  Since there is 
an large number of sensitivities a user can log in as he will need to 
key it in.
> That doesn't address sshd though.  Or gdm.  sshd shouldn't be too
> difficult.  There were some externally developed gdm patches for selinux
> that enabled context selection long ago, but nothing recent
> (pre-Fedora).
>   
I though the sshd would happen automatically when you login via a secure 
channel.  IE If I connect at TopSecret, I get TopSecret.

I think gdm will require other features such that I launch terminals at 
different sensitivity levels???

I think we should separate the TE Context selection from the Sensitivity 
Selection, in order to satisfy the MLS problems.
> You don't need to remove -l from newrole; you can just constrain its use
> via DAC and via SELinux policy, as Klaus has previously suggested.
>
>   
So it will not work on ptys?  Or are you thinking a boolean? I think it 
will be strange for a user to have the app work differently depending on 
how they logged in, but I guess this is another short coming of MLS.