[Virtio-fs] [virtiofsd PATCH v4 4/4] virtiofsd: support per-file DAX in FUSE_LOOKUP

[Greg Kurz]

On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 13:03:23 +0800
JeffleXu <jefflexu at linux.alibaba.com> wrote:

> 
> 
> On 8/19/21 9:08 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * JeffleXu (jefflexu at linux.alibaba.com) wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8/18/21 3:00 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> >>> * Jeffle Xu (jefflexu at linux.alibaba.com) wrote:
> >>>> For passthrough, when the corresponding virtiofs in guest is mounted
> >>>> with '-o dax=inode', advertise that the file is capable of per-file
> >>>> DAX if the inode in the backend fs is marked with FS_DAX_FL flag.
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Jeffle Xu <jefflexu at linux.alibaba.com>
> >>>> ---
> >>>>  tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>  1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> >>>> index 5b6228210f..4cbd904248 100644
> >>>> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> >>>> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> >>>> @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ struct lo_data {
> >>>>      int allow_direct_io;
> >>>>      int announce_submounts;
> >>>>      int perfile_dax_cap; /* capability of backend fs */
> >>>> +    bool perfile_dax; /* enable per-file DAX or not */
> >>>>      bool use_statx;
> >>>>      struct lo_inode root;
> >>>>      GHashTable *inodes; /* protected by lo->mutex */
> >>>> @@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn)
> >>>>  
> >>>>      if (conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_PERFILE_DAX && lo->perfile_dax_cap ) {
> >>>>          conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_PERFILE_DAX;
> >>>> +	lo->perfile_dax = 1;
> >>>> +    }
> >>>> +    else {
> >>>> +	lo->perfile_dax = 0;
> >>>>      }
> >>>>  }
> >>>>  
> >>>> @@ -983,6 +988,41 @@ static int do_statx(struct lo_data *lo, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
> >>>>      return 0;
> >>>>  }
> >>>>  
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * If the file is marked with FS_DAX_FL or FS_XFLAG_DAX, then DAX should be
> >>>> + * enabled for this file.
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +static bool lo_should_enable_dax(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *dir,
> >>>> +				 const char *name)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +    int res, fd;
> >>>> +    int ret = false;;
> >>>> +    unsigned int attr;
> >>>> +    struct fsxattr xattr;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +    if (!lo->perfile_dax)
> >>>> +	return false;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +    /* Open file without O_PATH, so that ioctl can be called. */
> >>>> +    fd = openat(dir->fd, name, O_NOFOLLOW);
> >>>> +    if (fd == -1)
> >>>> +        return false;
> >>>
> >>> Doesn't that defeat the whole benefit of using O_PATH - i.e. that we
> >>> might stumble into a /dev node or something else we're not allowed to
> >>> open?
> >>
> >> As far as I know, virtiofsd will pivot_root/chroot to the source
> >> directory, and can only access files inside the source directory
> >> specified by "-o source=". Then where do these unexpected files come
> >> from? Besides, fd opened without O_PATH here is temporary and used for
> >> FS_IOC_GETFLAGS/FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl only. It's closed when the
> >> function returns.
> > 
> > The guest is still allowed to mknod.
> > See:
> >    https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2021-01/msg05461.html
> > 
> > also it's legal to expose a root filesystem for a guest; the virtiofsd
> > should *never* open a device other than O_PATH - and it's really tricky
> > to do a check to see if it is a device in a race-free way.
> > 
> 
> Fine. Got it. However the returned fd (opened without O_PATH) is only
> used for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS/FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl, while in most cases
> for special device files, these two ioctls should return -ENOTTY.
> 

The actual problem is that a FIFO will cause openat() to block until
the other end of the FIFO is open for writing...

> If it's really a security issue, then lo_inode_open() could be used to

... and cause a DoS on virtiofsd. So yes, this is a security issue and
lo_inode_open() was introduced specifically to handle this.

> get a temporary fd, i.e., check if it's a special file before opening.
> After all, FUSE_OPEN also handles in this way. Besides, I can't
> understand what "race-free way" means.
> 

"race-free way" means a way that guarantees that file type
cannot change between the time you check it and the time
you open it (TOCTOU error). For example, doing a plain stat(),
checking st_mode and proceeding to open() is wrong : nothing
prevents the file to be unlinked and replaced by something
else between stat() and open().

We avoid that by keeping O_PATH fds around and using
lo_inode_open() instead of openat().

In your case, it seems that you should do the checking after
you have an actual lo_inode for the target file, and pass
that to lo_should_enable_dax() instead of the parent lo_inode
and target name.

Cheers,

--
Greg