[edk2-devel] RFC: Fast Migration for SEV and SEV-ES - blueprint and proof of concept

[Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum]

On 2020-11-06 17:17, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> Hello Tobin,
> 
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 04:48:12PM -0500, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum wrote:
>> On 2020-11-06 11:38, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
>> > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (tobin at linux.ibm.com) wrote:
>> > > On 2020-11-03 09:59, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>> > > > Hi Tobin,
>> > > >
>> > > > (keeping full context -- I'm adding Dave)
>> > > >
>> > > > On 10/28/20 20:31, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum wrote:
>> > > > > Hello,
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Dov Murik. James Bottomley, Hubertus Franke, and I have been working
>> > > > > on
>> > > > > a plan for fast live migration of SEV and SEV-ES (and SEV-SNP when
>> > > > > it's
>> > > > > out and even hopefully Intel TDX) VMs. We have developed an approach
>> > > > > that we believe is feasible and a demonstration that shows our
>> > > > > solution
>> > > > > to the most difficult part of the problem. In short, we have
>> > > > > implemented
>> > > > > a UEFI Application that can resume from a VM snapshot. We think this
>> > > > > is
>> > > > > the crux of SEV-ES live migration. After describing the context of our
>> > > > > demo and how it works, we explain how it can be extended to a full
>> > > > > SEV-ES migration. Our goal is to show that fast SEV and SEV-ES live
>> > > > > migration can be implemented in OVMF with minimal kernel changes. We
>> > > > > provide a blueprint for doing so.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Typically the hypervisor facilitates live migration. AMD SEV excludes
>> > > > > the hypervisor from the trust domain of the guest. When a hypervisor
>> > > > > (HV) examines the memory of an SEV guest, it will find only a
>> > > > > ciphertext. If the HV moves the memory of an SEV guest, the ciphertext
>> > > > > will be invalidated. Furthermore, with SEV-ES the hypervisor is
>> > > > > largely
>> > > > > unable to access guest CPU state. Thus, fast migration of SEV VMs
>> > > > > requires support from inside the trust domain, i.e. the guest.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > One approach is to add support for SEV Migration to the Linux kernel.
>> > > > > This would allow the guest to encrypt/decrypt its own memory with a
>> > > > > transport key. This approach has met some resistance. We propose a
>> > > > > similar approach implemented not in Linux, but in firmware,
>> > > > > specifically
>> > > > > OVMF. Since OVMF runs inside the guest, it has access to the guest
>> > > > > memory and CPU state. OVMF should be able to perform the manipulations
>> > > > > required for live migration of SEV and SEV-ES guests.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > The biggest challenge of this approach involves migrating the CPU
>> > > > > state
>> > > > > of an SEV-ES guest. In a normal (non-SEV migration) the HV sets the
>> > > > > CPU
>> > > > > state of the target before the target begins executing. In our
>> > > > > approach,
>> > > > > the HV starts the target and OVMF must resume to whatever state the
>> > > > > source was in. We believe this to be the crux (or at least the most
>> > > > > difficult part) of live migration for SEV and we hope that by
>> > > > > demonstrating resume from EFI, we can show that our approach is
>> > > > > generally feasible.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Our demo can be found at <https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fsecure-migration&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7C94e1ccd037b648bd43ef08d8829dac65%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637402961010808338%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=QA0DmtLkHFEovIu2Wd%2BYscW%2Fa9cNofg2xEQn3jPth9A%3D&reserved=0>. The
>> > > > > tooling repository is the best starting point. It contains
>> > > > > documentation
>> > > > > about the project and the scripts needed to run the demo. There are
>> > > > > two
>> > > > > more repos associated with the project. One is a modified edk2 tree
>> > > > > that
>> > > > > contains our modified OVMF. The other is a modified qemu, that has a
>> > > > > couple of temporary changes needed for the demo. Our demonstration is
>> > > > > aimed only at resuming from a VM snapshot in OVMF. We provide the
>> > > > > source
>> > > > > CPU state and source memory to the destination using temporary
>> > > > > plumbing
>> > > > > that violates the SEV trust model. We explain the setup in more
>> > > > > depth in
>> > > > > README.md. We are showing only that OVMF can resume from a VM
>> > > > > snapshot.
>> > > > > At the end we will describe our plan for transferring CPU state and
>> > > > > memory from source to guest. To be clear, the temporary tooling used
>> > > > > for
>> > > > > this demo isn't built for encrypted VMs, but below we explain how this
>> > > > > demo applies to and can be extended to encrypted VMs.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > We Implemented our resume code in a very similar fashion to the
>> > > > > recommended S3 resume code. When the HV sets the CPU state of a guest,
>> > > > > it can do so when the guest is not executing. Setting the state from
>> > > > > inside the guest is a delicate operation. There is no way to
>> > > > > atomically
>> > > > > set all of the CPU state from inside the guest. Instead, we must set
>> > > > > most registers individually and account for changes in control flow
>> > > > > that
>> > > > > doing so might cause. We do this with a three-phase trampoline. OVMF
>> > > > > calls phase 1, which runs on the OVMF map. Phase 1 sets up phase 2 and
>> > > > > jumps to it. Phase 2 switches to an intermediate map that reconciles
>> > > > > the
>> > > > > OVMF map and the source map. Phase 3 switches to the source map,
>> > > > > restores the registers, and returns into execution of the source. We
>> > > > > will go backwards through these phases in more depth.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > The last thing that resume to EFI does is return. Specifically, we use
>> > > > > IRETQ, which reads the values of RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, and SS from a
>> > > > > temporary stack and restores them atomically, thus returning to source
>> > > > > execution. Prior to returning, we must manually restore most other
>> > > > > registers to the values they had on the source. One particularly
>> > > > > significant register is CR3. When we return to Linux, CR3 must be
>> > > > > set to
>> > > > > the source CR3 or the first instruction executed in Linux will cause a
>> > > > > page fault. The code that we use to restore the registers and return
>> > > > > must be mapped in the source page table or we would get a page fault
>> > > > > executing the instructions prior to returning into Linux. The value of
>> > > > > CR3 is so significant, that it defines the three phases of the
>> > > > > trampoline. Phase 3 begins when CR3 is set to the source CR3. After
>> > > > > setting CR3, we set all the other registers and return.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Phase 2 mainly exists to setup phase 3. OVMF uses a 1-1 mapping,
>> > > > > meaning
>> > > > > that virtual addresses are the same as physical addresses. The kernel
>> > > > > page table uses an offset mapping, meaning that virtual addresses
>> > > > > differ
>> > > > > from physical addresses by a constant (for the most part). Crucially,
>> > > > > this means that the virtual address of the page that is executed by
>> > > > > phase 3 differs between the OVMF map and the source map. If we are
>> > > > > executing code mapped in OVMF and we change CR3 to point to the source
>> > > > > map, although the page may be mapped in the source map, the virtual
>> > > > > address will be different, and we will face undefined behavior. To fix
>> > > > > this, we construct intermediate page tables that map the pages for
>> > > > > phase
>> > > > > 2 and 3 to the virtual address expected in OVMF and to the virtual
>> > > > > address expected in the source map. Thus, we can switch CR3 from
>> > > > > OVMF's
>> > > > > map to the intermediate map and then from the intermediate map to the
>> > > > > source map. Phase 2 is much shorter than phase 3. Phase 2 is mainly
>> > > > > responsible for switching to the intermediate map, flushing the TLB,
>> > > > > and
>> > > > > jumping to phase 3.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Fortunately phase 1 is even simpler than phase 2. Phase 1 has two
>> > > > > duties. First, since phase 2 and 3 operate without a stack and can't
>> > > > > access values defined in OVMF (such as the addresses of the pages
>> > > > > containing phase 2 and 3), phase 1 must pass these values to phase 2
>> > > > > by
>> > > > > putting them in registers. Second, phase 1 must start phase 2 by
>> > > > > jumping
>> > > > > to it.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Given that we can resume to a snapshot in OVMF, we should be able to
>> > > > > migrate an SEV guest as long as we can securely communicate the VM
>> > > > > snapshot from source to destination. For our demo, we do this with a
>> > > > > handful of QMP commands. More sophisticated methods are required for a
>> > > > > production implementation.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > When we refer to a snapshot, what we really mean is the device state,
>> > > > > memory, and CPU state of a guest. In live migration this is
>> > > > > transmitted
>> > > > > dynamically as opposed to being saved and restored. Device state is
>> > > > > not
>> > > > > protected by SEV and can be handled entirely by the HV. Memory, on the
>> > > > > other hand, cannot be handled only by the HV. As mentioned previously,
>> > > > > memory needs to be encrypted with a transport key. A Migration Handler
>> > > > > on the source will coordinate with the HV to encrypt pages and
>> > > > > transmit
>> > > > > them to the destination. The destination HV will receive the pages
>> > > > > over
>> > > > > the network and pass them to the Migration Handler in the target VM so
>> > > > > they can be decrypted. This transmission will occur continuously until
>> > > > > the memory of the source and target converges.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Plain SEV does not protect the CPU state of the guest and therefore
>> > > > > does
>> > > > > not require any special mechanism for transmission of the CPU state.
>> > > > > We
>> > > > > plan to implement an end-to-end migration with plain SEV first. In
>> > > > > SEV-ES, the PSP (platform security processor) encrypts CPU state on
>> > > > > each
>> > > > > VMExit. The encrypted state is stored in memory. Normally this memory
>> > > > > (known as the VMSA) is not mapped into the guest, but we can add an
>> > > > > entry to the nested page tables that will expose the VMSA to the
>> > > > > guest.
>> > > > > This means that when the guest VMExits, the CPU state will be saved to
>> > > > > guest memory. With the CPU state in guest memory, it can be
>> > > > > transmitted
>> > > > > to the target using the method described above.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > In addition to the changes needed in OVMF to resume the VM, the
>> > > > > transmission of the VM from source to target will require a new code
>> > > > > path in the hypervisor. There will also need to be a few minor changes
>> > > > > to Linux (adding a mapping for our Phase 3 pages). Despite all the
>> > > > > moving pieces, we believe that this is a feasible approach for
>> > > > > supporting live migration for SEV and SEV-ES.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > For the sake of brevity, we have left out a few issues, including SMP
>> > > > > support, generation of the intermediate mappings, and more. We have
>> > > > > included some notes about these issues in the COMPLICATIONS.md file.
>> > > > > We
>> > > > > also have an outline of an end-to-end implementation of live migration
>> > > > > for SEV-ES in END-TO-END.md. See README.md for info on how to run the
>> > > > > demo. While this is not a full migration, we hope to show that fast
>> > > > > live
>> > > > > migration with SEV and SEV-ES is possible without major kernel
>> > > > > changes.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > -Tobin
>> > > >
>> > > > the one word that comes to my mind upon reading the above is,
>> > > > "overwhelming".
>> > > >
>> > > > (I have not been addressed directly, but:
>> > > >
>> > > > - the subject says "RFC",
>> > > >
>> > > > - and the documentation at
>> > > >
>> > > > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fsecure-migration%2Fresume-from-edk2-tooling%23what-changes-did-we-make&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7C94e1ccd037b648bd43ef08d8829dac65%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637402961010808338%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=3%2FYBNKU90Kas%2F%2FUccbeqLI5CB2QRXBlA0ARkrnEAe0U%3D&reserved=0
>> > > >
>> > > > states that AmdSevPkg was created for convenience, and that the feature
>> > > > could be integrated into OVMF. (Paraphrased.)
>> > > >
>> > > > So I guess it's tolerable if I make a comment: )
>> > > >
>> > > We've been looking forward to your perspective.
>> > >
>> > > > I've checked out the "mh-state-dev" branch of
>> > > > <https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fsecure-migration%2Fresume-from-efi-edk2.git&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7C94e1ccd037b648bd43ef08d8829dac65%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637402961010808338%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=WP17dXixeaanEpMzbwNmsIhTtGiizcl1jBMb4xmRMuk%3D&reserved=0>. It has
>> > > > 80 commits on top of edk2 master (base commit: d5339c04d7cd,
>> > > > "UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Add missing explicit PcdLib dependency",
>> > > > 2020-04-23).
>> > > >
>> > > > These commits were authored over the 6-7 months since April. It's
>> > > > obviously huge work. To me, most of these commits clearly aim at getting
>> > > > the demo / proof-of-concept functional, rather than guiding (more
>> > > > precisely: hand-holding) reviewers through the construction of the
>> > > > feature.
>> > > >
>> > > > In my opinion, the series is not upstreamable in its current format
>> > > > (which is presently not much more readable than a single-commit code
>> > > > drop). Upstreaming is probably not your intent, either, at this time.
>> > > >
>> > > > I agree that getting feedback ("buy-in") at this level of maturity is
>> > > > justified from your POV, before you invest more work into cleaning up /
>> > > > restructuring the series.
>> > > >
>> > > > My problem is that "hand-holding" is exactly what I'd need -- I cannot
>> > > > dedicate one or two weeks, as an indivisible block, to understanding
>> > > > your design. Nor can I approach the series patch-wise in its current
>> > > > format. Personally I would need the patch series to lead me through the
>> > > > whole design with baby steps ("ELI5"), meaning small code changes and
>> > > > detailed commit messages. I'd *also* need the more comprehensive
>> > > > guide-like documentation, as background material.
>> > > >
>> > > > Furthermore, I don't have an environment where I can test this
>> > > > proof-of-concept (and provide you with further incentive for cleaning up
>> > > > the series, by reporting success).
>> > > >
>> > > > So I hope others can spend the time discussing the design with you, and
>> > > > testing / repeating the demo. For me to review the patches, the patches
>> > > > should condense and replay your thinking process from the last 7 months,
>> > > > in as small as possible logical steps. (On the list.)
>> > > >
>> > > I completely understand your position. This PoC has a lot of
>> > > new ideas in it and you're right that our main priority was not
>> > > to hand-hold/guide reviewers through the code.
>> > >
>> > > One thing that is worth emphasizing is that the pieces we
>> > > are showcasing here are not the immediate priority when it
>> > > comes to upstreaming. Specifically, we looked into the trampoline
>> > > to make sure it was possible to migrate CPU state via firmware.
>> > > While we need this for SEV-ES and our goal is to support SEV-ES,
>> > > it is not the first step. We are currently working on a PoC for
>> > > a full end-to-end migration with SEV (non-ES), which may be a better
>> > > place for us to begin a serious discussion about getting things
>> > > upstream. We will focus more on making these patches accessible
>> > > to the upstream community.
>> >
>> > With my migration maintainer hat on, I'd like to understand a bit more
>> > about these different approaches;  they could be quite invasive, so I'd
>> > like to make sure we're not doing one and throwing it away - it would
>> > be great if you could explain your non-ES approach; you don't need to
>> > have POC code to explain it.
>> >
>> Our non-ES approach is a subset of our ES approach. For ES, the
>> Migration Handler in the guest needs to help out with memory and
>> CPU state. For plain SEV, the HV can set the CPU state, but we still
>> need a way to transfer the memory. The current POC only deals
>> with the CPU state.
>> 
>> We're still working out some of the details in QEMU, but the basic
>> idea of transferring memory is that each time the HV needs to send a
>> page to the target, it will ask the Migration Handler in the guest
>> for a version of the page that is encrypted with a transport key.
>> Since the MH is inside the guest, it can read from any address
>> in guest memory. The Migration Handlers on the source and the target
>> will share a key. Once the source encrypts the requested page with
>> the transport key, it can safely hand it off to the HV. Once the page
>> reaches the target, the target HV will pass the page into the
>> Migration Handler, which will decrypt using the transport key and
>> move the page to the appropriate address.
>> 
>> A few things to note:
>> 
>> - The Migration Handler on the source needs to be running in the
>>   guest alongside the VM. On the target, the MH needs to startup
>>   before we can receive any pages. In both cases we are thinking
>>   that an additional vCPU can be started for the MH to run on.
>>   This could be spawned dynamically or live for the duration of
>>   the guest.
>> 
>> - We need to make sure that the Migration Handler on the target
>>   does not overwrite itself when it receives pages from the
>>   source. Since we run the same firmware on the source and
>>   target, and since the MH is runtime code, the memory
>>   footprint of the MH should match on the source and the
>>   target. We will need to make sure there are no weird
>>   relocations.
>> 
>> - There are some complexities arising from the fact that not
>>   every page in an SEV VM is encrypted. We are looking into
>>   the best way to handle encrypted vs. shared pages.
>> 
> 
> Raising this question here as part of this discussion ... are you
> thinking of adding the page encryption bitmap (as we do for the slow
> migration patches) here to figure out if the guest pages are encrypted
> or not ?
> 

We are using the bitmap for the first iteration of our end-to-end POC.

> The page encryption status will need notifications from the guest 
> kernel
> and OVMF.
> 
> Additionally, is the page encrpytion bitmap support going to be added 
> as
> a hypercall interface to the guest, which also means that the
> guest kernel needs to be modified ?

Although the bitmap is handy, we would like to avoid the patches you
are alluding to. We are currently looking into how we can eliminate
the bitmap.

-Tobin

> 
> Thanks,
> Ashish
> 
>> Hopefully those notes don't confound my earlier explanation too
>> much. I think that's most of the picture for non-ES migration.
>> Let me know if you have any questions. ES migration would use
>> the same approach for transferring memory.
>> 
>> -Tobin
>> 
>> > Dave
>> >
>> > > In the meantime, perhaps there is something we can do to help
>> > > make our current work more clear. We could potentially explain
>> > > things on a call or create some additional documentation. While
>> > > our goal is not to shove this version of the trampoline upstream,
>> > > it is significant to our plan as a whole and we want to help
>> > > people understand it.
>> > >
>> > > -Tobin
>> > >
>> > > > I really don't want to be the bottleneck here, which is why I would
>> > > > support introducing this feature as a separate top-level package
>> > > > (AmdSevPkg).
>> > > >
>> > > > Thanks
>> > > > Laszlo
>> > >


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