experimental relaxed policy

[Thomas Molina]

> >>There has been some work done on a "relaxed" policy.  The intention of
> >>this policy is to simply protect system daemons, and not user logins. 
> >>Right now there is just a policy for apache (which doesn't really work
> >>due to a kernel bug).  Everything else runs in an "unconfined_t" domain,
> >>which essentially has every SELinux permission, and thus you are back to
> >>relying on DAC.
> 
> One of the things we are considering is limiting the number of daemons 
> we will lock down.    We have picked out
> an arbitrary number of 5 for now and are trying to figure out which are 
> the 5 daemons we would like to put in relaxed policy.
> 
> My ideas are
> 
> apache
> bind
> sendmail
> ftp
> ssh???  (Not sure this one is worth securing).

I am apparently not expressing myself well.  My point is that if we are 
relaxing policy to the point where you are relying on DAC, what is the 
point?  I want to test strict policy on those things where it most makes a 
difference.  In that vein, sendmail and bind are two which have 
historically had a lot of problems.  I would think those would be 
candidates for stricter policy, not more permissive.